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 Flexible approaches for eliciting preferences of decision makers involved in a 
conflict are developed along with applications to real-world disputes. More specifically, 
two multiple criteria decision making approaches are proposed for capturing the relative 
preferences of a decision maker participating in a conflict situation. A case study in 
logistics concerned with the conflict arising over the expansion of port facilities on the 
west coast of North America as well as a transportation negotiation dispute are used to 
illustrate how these approaches can be integrated with the Graph Model for Conflict 
Resolution, a practical conflict analysis methodology.  
 Ascertaining the preferences of the decision makers taking part in a conflict 
constitutes a key element in the construction of a formal conflict model. In practice, the 
relative preferences, which reflect each decision maker’s objectives or goals in a given 
situation, are rather difficult to obtain. The first method for preference elicitation is to 
integrate an Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) preference ranking method with the 
Graph Model for Conflict Resolution. The AHP approach is used to elicit relative 
preferences of decision makers, and this preference information is then fed into a graph 
model for further stability analyses. The case study of the Canadian west coast port 
congestion conflict is investigated using this integrated model. 
 Another approach is based on a fuzzy multiple criteria out-ranking technique called 
ELECTRE III. It is also employed for ranking states or possible scenarios in a conflict 
from most to least preferred, with ties allowed, by the decision maker according to his or 
her own value system. The model is applied to a transportation negotiation dispute 








I wish to express my sincere gratitude to my supervisors, Professor Keith W. Hipel and 
Kevin W. Li. It is they who introduced me to this world of science and showed me many 
incredible elements within it. Without their kind assistances, my research would not have 
been possible and I would never have come so far. 
 
My appreciation is also extended to my readers, Professor Mitali De, for the gracious 
opportunity she provided me, and also Professor John Yeow. They gave me many 
valuable suggestions and advice when reviewing my thesis. 
 
Additionally, I would like to thank many faculty, staff, and fellow students in both the 
Department of Systems Design Engineering and other departments, for their 
encouragement and companionship. 
 
Finally and most importantly, I am truly grateful to my family – my parents and my 








This thesis is dedicated to Enlong Ke and Xinqing Wang, my beloved parents. 
 vi
Table of Contents 
 
Chapter 1 Introduction              1 
1.1. Motivation of the Research  ………………………………..…  2 
1.2. Outline of the Thesis  …………………….………….….……  3 
 
Chapter 2 The Graph Model for Conflict Resolution      4 
2.1. Basic Concepts  ………………………………………………...  7 
2.2.1. Traditional representation for a game  …………………….  7 
2.2.2. Graph form  ………………………………………………..  10 
2.2.3. The graph model for conflict resolution ……………………  12 
2.2. Decision Support System GMCR II  …………………………..  16 
2.3. Preference Ranking  ……………………………………………  18 
2.4. Summary  ………………………………………………………  19 
 
Chapter 3 Multiple Criteria Decision Making        20 
3.1. Introduction  ………………………………………………….  20 
3.1.1. Basic concepts  ……………………………………………... 21 
3.1.2. MCDM techniques  ………………………………………… 22 
3.2. AHP  ………………………………………………………..…... 23 
3.3. ELECTRE III   ………………..………………………………..  28  
3.4. Summary  ……………………………………………………….  32 
 vii
 
Chapter 4 Integrated AHP Approach for Preference Ranking in GMCR   33 
4.1. Structure  ……………………………………………………….  35 
4.2. Case Study: Canadian West Coast Congestion Problem  ………  37 
4.2.1. Background  ……………………………………………….  38 
4.2.2. Model description  …………………………………………  40 
4.2.3. Feasible state generation  ………………………………….  41 
4.2.4. Preference ranking using the integrated AHP approach  .…  42 
4.2.5. Stability analysis  ………………………………………….  51 
4.2.6. Status quo analysis  …………………………………….….  53 
4.2.7. Further discussion  ………………………………………..  54 
4.3. Summary  ………………………………………………………  55 
 
Chapter 5 Three-Layer Hierarchical Analysis Model for Relative Reference 
Ranking in the Graph Model         56 
5.1. Three-Layer Hierarchical Analysis Model  ….………………....  57 
5.1.1. Determination of criteria  ………………………………….  59 
5.1.2. Identification of actions  …………………………………...  59 
5.1.3. Construction of the three-layer structure  ………….………  60 
5.1.4. Synthesis of the evaluation matrix  ………………………...  62 
5.1.5. Calculation of the relative ranking of states  ………………  63 
5.1.6. Output of preference information  …………………………  67 
5.2. Case study: A Transportation Negotiation Problem  ……….…..  68 
 viii
5.2.1. Construction of the three-layer structure  ………….………  70 
5.2.2. Synthesis of the evaluation matrix  ………………………..  73 
5.2.3. Calculation of the relative ranking of states  ………………  74 
5.2.4. Stability analysis  …………………………………………..  75 
5.2.5. Status quo analysis  ………………………………………..  76  
5.3. Summary  ……………………………………………………….  77 
 
Chapter 6 Conclusions              78 
6.1. Comparison of the Two Proposed Approaches  ……………….  79 
6.2. Summary of Contributions  …………………………………….. 80 
6.3. Future Research Opportunities  …………………………………. 81 
 
References                  83 
 ix
List of Tables 
 
Table 2.1 Prisoner’s Dilemma in normal form. 
Table 2.2 Prisoner’s Dilemma in option form. 
Table 2.3 Stability definitions and human behavior. 
Table 2.4 Relationships of the solution concepts in n-player conflicts. 
Table 3.1 A sample matrix for pairwise comparison. 
Table 3.2 The pairwise comparison scale. 
Table 3.3 Table of random inconsistency for different sizes of matrices. 
Table 3.4 Main characteristics of ELECTRE methods. 
Table 4.1 Decision makers and corresponding options for the Canadian West Coast 
Congestion Problem. 
Table 4.2 Pairwise comparison matrix for influence powers from Canada’s standpoint. 
Table 4.3 Pairwise comparison matrices for each DM’s options from Canada’s 
standpoint. 
Table 4.4 Pairwise comparison matrix for influence powers from US’s standpoint. 
Table 4.5 Pairwise comparison matrices for each DM’s options from US’s standpoint. 
Table 4.6 Pairwise comparison matrix for influence powers from China’s standpoint. 
Table 4.7 Pairwise comparison matrices for each DM’s options from China’s 
standpoint. 
Table 4.8 Pairwise comparison matrix for influence powers from Traders’ standpoint. 
Table 4.9 Pairwise comparison matrices for each DM’s options from Traders’ 
 x
standpoint. 
Table 4.10 Overall ranking weights. 
Table 4.11 Possible resolutions. 
Table 4.12 State transition from the status quo to state 98. 
Table 5.1 DMs and options in the transportation negotiation problem.  
Table 5.2 Feasible states. 
Table 5.3 Weights for the Criterion-Action Layer. 
Table 5.4 Weights for the Action-Option Layer.  
Table 5.5 Relative preference information.  
Table 5.6 Preference rankings.  
Table 5.7 Equilibrium for the transportation negotiation problem. 
Table 5.8 State transition from the status quo to state 11. 
Table 6.1 The commonalities and differences between the two proposed approaches. 
 xi
List of Figures 
 
Figure 1.1 Organization of the thesis. 
Figure 2.1 General procedures for applying GMCR. 
Figure 2.2 Prisoner’s Dilemma in graph form. 
Figure 2.3 Modified Prisoner’s Dilemma in graph form. 
Figure 2.4 Relationships of n-player game stability concepts. 
Figure 2.5 Graphical illustrations of preferences. 
Figure 2.6 GMCR II structure. 
Figure 3.1 A typical AHP structure. 
Figure 3.2 Structural differences between a linear hierarchy and a nonlinear network. 
Figure 4.1 Comparison of standard and adapted AHP. 
Figure 4.2 Structure of the adapted AHP approach. 
Figure 4.3 Adapted AHP model for the West Coast Congestion Problem. 
Figure 5.1 The Framework of a three-layer hierarchical analysis model for relative 
preferences. 
Figure 5.2 Construction of the three-layer relationship structure. 
Figure 5.3 Pseudo-criterion. 
Figure 5.4 Relationships in the hierarchical analytical model for the Carrier. 








A strategic conflict is a decision situation in which two or more decision makers 
(DMs) are in dispute over some issue. One can employ the Graph Model for Conflict 
Resolution (GMCR) (Fang et al., 1993) to investigate a real-world conflict situation by 
following the two main phases consisting of modeling and analysis. As a simple but 
flexible methodology, GMCR is designed to analyze conflicts arising from a wide range of 
areas, such as environmental management, labor-management negotiations, military 
strategies, and peace-keeping activities, to name a few (Kilgour and Hipel, 2005). The 
graph model facilitates interested parties to put complicated strategic decision problems 
into perspective and attain a better understanding about the current situation as well as 
envisioning potential resolutions (Fang et al., 1993). Of all the information required for 
GMCR, consisting of the DMs, each DM’s options or courses of actions, and each DM’s 
relative preferences over all feasible outcomes, preference information is the most 
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important and sensitive input for calibrating a conflict model and subsequently carrying out 
a stability analysis. Each DM’s relative preferences reflect his or her objectives or roles 
under a given conflict situation. 
 
1.1. Motivation of the Research 
In practice, quite often, DM’s relative preferences are not easy to obtain. The 
objective of this research is to develop new approaches to elicit preference information 
reflecting diverse values or criteria of a given DM for ranking states, and thereby, 
expanding and enriching preference elicitation approaches for employment with GMCR. 
More specifically, two approaches are considered in this thesis: 1) an integrated Analytic 
Hierarchy Process (AHP) (Saaty, 1980, 1982, 2001) preference ranking method and 2) a 
three-layer hierarchical structure based on ELECTRE III (Roy, 1968, 1989, 2005) and 
fuzzy logic (Zadeh, 1965, 1973). The first method is to integrate a modified AHP 
preference ranking method with the Graph Model for Conflict Resolution. The AHP 
approach is used to elicit relative preferences for decision makers, and this preference 
information is then fed into a graph model for further stability analyses. First introduced by 
De et al. (2002) and Fu (2003), the second approach is based on a fuzzy multiple criteria 
out-ranking technique called ELECTRE III. It is also employed for ranking states or 
possible scenarios in the conflict from most to least preferred, with ties allowed, by the 
decision maker according to his or her own value system.  
Another key motivation is to apply the proposed approaches to real-world disputes. 
The Canadian west coast port congestion problem is investigated in this thesis by 
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employing the first approach. The strategic analyses carried out in this research suggest that 
Canada should expand port facilities at various locations, thereby, encouraging traders to 
continue choosing the Canadian west coast as one of their major trade gateways to North 
America. Additionally, a transportation negotiation problem between the two key parties, 
shippers and carriers, is used to illustrate how to implement the second approach. Detailed 
descriptions are furnished in Chapters 4 and 5. 
 
1.2. Outline of the Thesis  
As shown by Figure 1.1, this thesis consists of four main stages: problem descriptions, 
methodology overviews, proposed approaches and applications, as well as conclusions and 
future work. Remaining chapters are organized as follows. 
Some basics of GMCR are presented in Chapter 2, including essential ideas, major 
components, stability definitions and related analyses, as well as the associated decision 
support system (DSS), GMCR II. In the Chapter 3, the basic ideas underlying multiple 
criteria decision making (MCDM) and some typical techniques are introduced, with an 
emphasis on AHP and ELECTRE. Chapter 4 adapts an AHP approach to elicit relative 
preferences for decision makers, and this preference information is then fed into a graph 
model for further stability analyses. The case study of the Canadian west coast congestion 
problem is used to illustrate how to implement this approach in practice. Chapter 5 
addresses a three-layer hierarchical analysis model, based on the out-ranking method, 
ELECTRE III, for relative reference ranking in GMCR. The case study of a transportation 
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negotiation conflict is employed to demonstrate its use. The thesis concludes with some 
















Conflicts could happen any time and anywhere in the real world. Conflict models are 
designed to approximate reality and systematically structure the essential components of a 
given dispute (Fang et al., 1993). The main motivation of GMCR is the demand for a 
comprehensive methodology to understand conflict decision-making and conflict resolution, 
since other competing methods fail to provide the required kind of analysis and advice 
(Kilgour and Hipel, 2005). The graph model is designed to be simple and flexible, as well 
as to have minimal requirements of information.  
The original idea of GMCR is introduced by Kilgour, Hipel and Fang in 1987 while the 
first complete presentation is furnished by Fang, Hipel and Kilgour in 1993. GMCR has 
been applied to a wide range of application areas: from environmental management to 
labour management; from military and peace-keeping activities to economic issues; from 


















Figure 2.1 General Procedures for applying GMCR (adapted from Fang et al. (1993)). 
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Figure 2.1 illustrates the general procedure for applying the methodology of GMCR to 
a real-world conflict. Two main stages, modeling and analysis, are involved in this 
procedure. In the modeling stage, essential model elements, such as the decision makers 
(DMs), their options, and the relative preferences, are identified based on the understanding 
of the actual dispute. States are derived from the given options. Then this information is fed 
into the next stage: analysis. In this stage, the stability of every state is first calculated from 
each DM’s viewpoint. Subsequently, the overall equilibria, which contain the states that are 
stable for all DMs, can be obtained. By interpretation and sensitivity analyses, DMs or 
other interested parties can understand the meaning of resolutions in terms of the real-world 
disputes. Note that feedback is allowed in the procedure. Feedback means that, at every step 
of the modeling or analysis stage, one may return to any previous point whenever new 
information is found. This characteristic makes GMCR more flexible and practical. 
In the upcoming subsection, a famous conflict called Prisoner’s Dilemma is used to 
explain some basic ideas about game theory. This same application is then employed to 
introduce modeling and analysis stages in the Graph Model for Conflict Resolution, 
followed by an overview of the associated decision support system, GMCR II.  
 
2.1. Basic Concepts   
2.1.1. Traditional representations of a game 
Generally, DMs are referred to as players in game theory (GT). In this section, a 
classical simplified two-player game example, Prisoner’s Dilemma, is employed to 
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illustrate the basic ideas of a standard GT model. This game comes from a story about two 
suspects involved in a crime, who are held for questioning in two separate cells. There is 
enough evidence to convict each of them of a minor offense, but not the major crime unless 
one of them finks against the other (Osborne, 2003). In this case, players (DMs) are 
obviously the two suspects. Each of them has an action set of {Quiet (Q), Fink (F)}. Hence, 
four possible states can be formed on the basis of two suspects’ conflict decisions: 
1) (QQ) – Both suspects choose to keep quiet. Then both of them will be convicted of 
the minor offense and spend one year in prison. 
2) (QF) – Suspect 1 keeps quiet and suspect 2 finks. Then suspect 2 will be freed and 
used as a witness against suspect 1; suspect 1 will spend four years in prison. 
3) (FQ) – Suspect 2 keeps quiet and suspect 1 finks. Then suspect 1 will be freed and 
used as a witness against suspect 2; suspect 2 will spend four years in prison. 
4) (FF) – Both suspects fink, then each will spend three years in prison. 
Correspondingly, suspect 1’s preference, from best to worst, is (FQ), (QQ), (FF), and 
(QF). Suspect 2’s preference is (QF), (QQ), (FF), and (FQ). Let 1P (FQ) = 4, 1P (QQ) = 3, 
1P (FF) = 2, and 1P (QF) = 1 denote the payoffs for suspect 1; as well as 2P (QF) = 4, 
2P (QQ) = 3, 2P (FF) = 2, and 2P (FQ) = 1 denote the payoffs for suspect 2. Table 2.1 
depicts Prisoner’s Dilemma in normal form. The rows of the matrix represent the available 
strategies of suspect 1 and the columns the strategies of suspect 2. Each possible state is 
represented by a cell of the matrix, where the first entry represents the payoff for suspect 1 





Table 2.1 The Prisoner’s Dilemma in Normal Form 
 
  Suspect 2 
  Quiet (Q) Fink (F) 
Quiet (Q) (3,3) (1,4) 
Suspect 1 




 Intuitively, each suspect is willing to move unilaterally from a low preference to a 
higher one. Therefore, in Table 2.1, suspect 1 would only like to move from top to bottom 
and suspect 2 would only like to move form left to right. Based on these movements, the 
states will be finally stabilized at (FF), where both suspects will have a payoff of 2, because 
no suspect can unilaterally do better by choosing an action that differs from this state. This 
stable state is called a Nash Equilibrium (Osborne, 2003). In practice, other equilibria are 
also considered. Some of them will be discussed in the section describing the stability 
definitions for GMCR. 
Table 2.2 illustrates Prisoner’s Dilemma in option form, where each player’s options or 
available courses of action are listed, as well as a rule for specifying the payoffs or 
preferences for each player. Note that a “Y” placed beside an option means the option is 







Table 2.2. The Prisoner’s Dilemma in the Option Form 
 
 States 
1.  Suspect 1     
      (1) Quiet N N Y Y 
     
2.  Suspect 2     
      (2) Quiet N Y N Y 
     
Normal form notation (FF) (FQ) (QF) (QQ) 
     
Preference Vectors 
Suspect 1  
N Y N Y





Suspect 2  
Y Y N N








2.1.2. The Graph form 
Although the normal and option forms can depict DMs’ options and courses of actions 
easily, they both have some drawbacks, especially when considering the movements from 
one state to another (Fang et al., 1993). Therefore, a more flexible and understandable 
representation form, the graph form, is introduced. Firstly, some related definitions in graph 
theory are presented. Interested readers can find more details in research by Harary et al. 
(1965), Harary (1969), Berge (1973), Bondy and Murty (1975), and Fang et al., (1993).  
A direct graph, G, is defined as a 2-tuple (S, A), where 
1) S is a set { }1 2, ,..., ns s s  of elements called vertices, and 
2) A is a set { }1 2, ,..., ma a a  of elements called arcs.  
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A is the Cartesian product S S× . So if ija A∈  is an arc from vertex is  to js  such 
that ( ),ij i ja s s= , then ija  is said to join is  to js , where is  is the tail of ija , and js  is 
its head. Also, an arc with an identical head and tail is called a loop. A directed graph is 
finite if its vertex set is finite.  
The reachability matrix R of a directed graph G is an n n×  matrix, ijr⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ . When 
( ),i js s  is an arc of G, 1ija = ; otherwise, 0ija = . A directed graph is called transitive if 
there is an arc ( ),i js s  whenever arcs ( ),i ks s  and ( ),k js s  are in G, for any i , j, and k.  
Based on these definitions, the graph form for a game can now be developed. Figure 
2.2 shows the graph form of Prisoner’s Dilemma. Vertices represent states, and arcs stand 
for possible movements. The direction of an arc in a player’s graph indicates the direction 
of the movement that the suspect can make. Also, the preferences for each player are listed 
under the corresponding graph, where the ith entry is the payoff value of the ith state. 
Moreover, this graph model can be further modified if a DM’s decision to move from 
one state to another cannot be reversed. In the graph model, this type of irreversible move 
can be conveniently modeled as a unidirectional arc. For instance, if suspect 1 would only 
move from state (QQ) to (FQ) and from state (QF) to (FF), the arc from state (FQ) to (QQ) 
and from state (FF) to (QF) can be eliminated. The same situation also applies to suspect 






a) P1 = (2, 4, 1, 3)      b) P2 = (2, 1, 4, 3) 
Figure 2.2 Prisoner’s Dilemma in graph form: a) suspect 1; b) suspect 2. 
 
 
a) P1 = (2, 4, 1, 3)      b) P2 = (2, 1, 4, 3) 
Figure 2.3 Modified Prisoner’s Dilemma in graph form: a) suspect 1; b) suspect 2. 
 
2.1.3. The graph model for conflict resolution 
GMCR is developed based on the definition of the graph form for a game. This 
methodology has the following four basic components (Fang et al., 1993; Kilgour et al., 
1996; Hipel et al., 1997; Kilgour and Hipel, 2005):  
1) A set of DMs, { }1, 2,...,N n= ;   
2) A set of nodes, { }1 2, ,..., mS s s s= , where each node represents a feasible state 
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describing a distinguishable scenario of the conflict; 
3) A collection of finite directed graphs { }( , ),i iG S A i N= ∈  to track unilateral 
moves for each DM i, where iG  is the directed graph for DM i and iA  is DM i's set of 
directed arcs in iG , for which each arc stands for the move DM i can make in one step 
between two states;  
4) Each DM’s relative preferences over S, ( )iP ⋅ . For each state js S∈ and each DM 
i N∈ , the numerical value of ( )iP k measures the worth of state js  to DM i. 
Note that, although the set of states is identical for all DMs, each DM has a 
distinguishable preference ranking due to his/her different interests. Preference is discussed 
in detail in the last section of this chapter. 
When DMs’ moves and countermoves are assessed, it is reasonable to assume that each 
DM can only move from one state to another unilaterally, where the other DM’s actions are 
fixed. When he/she prefers to stay at a state, or in other words, does not have the motivation 
to move away from this state unilaterally, this state is said to be stable for the given DM. 
An equilibrium is obtained when a state is stable for all DMs under a certain solution 
concept.  
In GMCR, stability definitions are the most important concept related to determining 
and analyzing final resolutions. In the graph model, several distinct solution concepts are 
employed to define stability, thereby capturing DM’s different behavioural and decision 
patterns in the face of conflict. The main stability definitions currently considered by 
GMCR include Nash Stability (R), General Metarationality (GMR), Symmetric 
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Metarationality (SMR), Sequential Stability (SEQ), Limited Move Stablity (Lh), and 
Non-Myopic Stability (NM).  
 
Table 2.3 Stability Definitions and Human Behaviour (adapted from Fang et al. (1993)) 
 
Definition Description References Foresight Disimprovements
Nash stability (R) 
A DM cannot unilaterally move to a more 
preferred state. 
Nash (1950, 1951); 






All of a DM’s unilateral improvements are 






All of a DM’s unilateral improvements are 
still sanctioned, even after a possible 





All of a DM’s unilateral improvements are 
sanctioned by its opponents’ subsequent 
unilateral improvements. 





stability ( hL ) 
A fixed number (h) of state transitions are 
contemplated; all DMs are assumed to act 
optimally by backward induction. 
Kilgour (1985); 





The limiting case of the limited-move 
stability as the number of state transition 
approaches ∞ . 
Brams and Wittman 
(1981); 
Kilgour (1984,1985);





Table 2.3 shows a list of these solution concepts with their descriptions, original 
references, and associated characteristics. As an important feature, foresight refers to a 
DM’s capacity of foreseeing possible future moves under a particular stability definition. 
As shown in Table 2.3, Nash stability has the lowest foresight, while NM has the highest. 
The strategic disimporvement in the next column means a DM may move to a less 
preferred state temporarily in order to reach a more preferred one eventually. The 
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disimporvement by opponents means that other DMs may choose to move to a less 
preferred state in order to block the focal DM’s unilateral improvements. For mathematical 
definitions, references, and other details, see Fang et al. (1993). 
Additionally, for an n-player model, the relationships among these stabilities can be 
found in Table 2.4 and graphically illustrated by Figure 2.4. The detailed proof and 
explanations can be found in Fang et al. (1993). This knowledge of relationship is very 
informative in practice. 
 
 
        All states
        GMR











Table 2.4 Relationships of the solution concepts in n-player conflicts (Fang et al., 1993) 
Individual (Stability) and Group (Equilibrium) 
1R L=  
( )1R L SMR GMR⊆ ⊆  
( )1R L SEQ GMR⊆ ⊆  
2L SEQ GMR⊆ ⊆  
( )2hL h GMR> ⊆  
 
 
2.2. Decision Support System GMCR II 
As an efficient computer implementation of the graph model, GMCR II is a 
comprehensive decision support system (DSS), which is developed for the strategic 
analysis of real-world interactive decision problems. GMCR II furnishes a friendly user 
interface, requires minimal input, and completes calculations as well as analyses in an 
expeditious manner (Fang et al., 2003a, 2003b; Kilgour et al., 1996; Hipel et al., 1997; 
Peng, 1999).  
The structure of GMCR II is depicted in Figure 2.5. As shown, the modeling subsystem 
receives user data, DMs and options, feasible state lists, reachable lists and preference 
rankings, through the user interface. GMCR then processes the input data and automatically 
converts them into a formal graph model that can be accepted by the analysis engine. The 
analysis engine applies each solution concept to each state for each DM. Stability results 
are then derived and stored in an efficient and easy-to-retrieve bit-wise structure, supported 
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by the output presentation system. For details about GMCR II, readers are referred to Fang 
et al. (2003a, 2003b). 
 
 
Figure 2.5 GMCR II structure (Fang et al., 2003a).  
 
This decision support system can be beneficially applied to three main situations listed 
as follows (Kilgour and Hipel, 2005): 
1) Analysis and simulation tool for conflict participants: GMCR II can be used in 
simulation or role-playing exercises that aim to achieve a better understanding or prediction 
of real world conflicts.  
 
2) Analysis and communication tool for mediators: GMCR II can be used by 
mediators to reconcile opposite situations, creat a more disharmonious atmosphere in which 
to carry out negotiations, and assist in conducting and settling the disputes more effectively.  
3) Analysis tool for a third party or a regulator: GMCR II can be used by other 
interested parties, such as representatives of a third party or a regulator, as a helpful 
mechanism to understand the conflict and perhaps seek fact-binding or legal-binding rules.  
 
2.3. Preference Ranking  
Preference ranking, or ordering of states from most to least preferred, with ties allowed, 
is a crucial element when a strategic dispute is analyzed by the graph model. In this section, 
some essential preference definitions for GMCR are introduced. 
For a certain DM i, the relative preferences over the set of states, S, can be represented 
by binary relations { },i i∼  on S, where  indicates that DM i strictly prefers s over 
q; and  indicates that DM i equally prefers s and q. This pair of binary relations 
constitutes a preference structure with the following properties: 
is q
is q∼
1)  is asymmetric, i.e., it cannot occur that both  and ; i is q iq s
2)  is reflexive an symmetric; and i∼
3) { },i i∼  is strongly complete. 
GMCR II is equipped with three preference elicitation techniques: option weighting, 
option prioritizing, and direct ranking. These techniques assume that the preferences are 
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transitive, and hence, states can be ordered. When employing option weighting, a user 
assigns option weights to reflect the relative importance of options from a given DM’s 
viewpoint. In option prioritization, hierarchical preference statements are given in terms of 
one or more options and logical combinations thereof. Direct ranking permits a user to 
fine-tune the ranking of states that have first been obtained according to option weighting 
or option prioritization. For some small disputes, the user may wish to directly rank the 
states without any prior ordering.  
However, in practice, sometimes the relative preferences are fairly hard to obtain, even 
with these three techniques. Therefore, two new approaches are proposed in this thesis in 
order to improve this procedure and serve users better. The details are presented in Chapters 
4 and 5. 
 
2.4. Summary 
In this chapter, the basic concepts of the Graph Model for Conflict Resolution, as well 
as the associated decision support system, GMCR II, are introduced and explained. As the 
most critical and sensitive element of GMCR, preference issue is discussed in detail. In 
order to elicit the preference rankings in GMCR, the idea of multiple criteria decision 
making and two preference elicitation approaches based on practical MCDM techniques are 











Making decisions arise in everyday life. Most of the decisions are made based on 
different criteria. For example, when buying a car, people need to consider price, safety, 
reliability, brand reputation, size, oil consumption, repair costs, and so on. Even when 
facing the same problem, different people might have different preferences about these 
criteria, and hence, make different decisions.  
In this chapter, key concepts of multiple criteria decision making (MCDM) are 
introduced, and two specific techniques, the Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) and 
ELECTRE, are discussed in greater detail in order to describe further research.  
 
3.1. Introduction  
Roy (1996) provides a definition on decision making that explains it in a theoretical 
manner. Decision making, also called decision aiding, “is the activity of the person who, 
through the use of explicit but not necessarily completely formalized models, helps obtain 
elements of responses to the questions posed by a stakeholder of a decision process. These 
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elements work towards clarifying the decision and usually towards recommending, or 
simply favoring, a behavior that will increase the consistency between the evolution of the 
process and this stakeholder’s objectives and value system”. The term “stakeholder” 
mentioned in this definition may also be called a decision maker (DM).  
Vincke (1992) defines an MCDM problem as a situation consisting of a set of actions 
(decision alternatives) and a family of criteria. A DM needs to determine: 1) a subset of 
actions that are the best ones considering the criteria; 2) the division of actions according to 
specific rules; or 3) the ranking of the actions from the best to the worst.  
The purpose of MCDM is to provide a DM with some useful tools, which help him/her 
make decisions, especially when most of the times many contradictory points of view need 
to be taken into consideration (Vincke, 1992). Each point of view can be associated with a 
specific criterion, which shall be accounted for where the decision alternatives are 
evaluated (Figueira et al., 2005).  
 
3.1.1. Basic concepts 
There are three basic concepts for structuring and modeling an MCDM problem. From 
the definition of MCDM discussed earlier, two of them are rather obvious: actions and 
criteria. The third one is “problematic1” that “refers to the way in which decision making is 
                                                        
1 This term is translated by McCord from the original French word “problématique” in the book of Roy (1996). 
Translator noted the reason of this translation is that: “We considered translating this term as problem statements, problem 
types, or problem formulations, but felt that these could give the wrong impression. After discussion with several 
researchers in this field, we decided to remain close to the original French word ‘problématique’, even if it seems like 
jargon and sounds somewhat awkward, but which we feel will avoid misunderstanding.” 
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envisaged”. Some brief descriptions of these concepts are presented as follows (Roy 1996). 
1) Alternatives, or more generally, potential actions: possible resolutions for a given 
MCDM problem. These possible resolutions do not have to be one particular action but a 
combination of many actions.   
2) Criteria: the tools or functions used to evaluate and compare the potential actions 
from different points of view. The performance of each action is evaluated by three types of 
scales: 1) purely ordinal scale, 2) quantitative scale, and 3) other types.  
3) Problematic: the way in which MCDM problems are formulated. There are four 
main reference problematics usually used in practice: 1) description problematic, 2) choice 
problematic, 3) sorting problematic, and 4) ranking problematic. 
 
3.1.2. MCDM techniques 
Since the idea of MCDM was established, numerous techniques have been developed. 
These MCDM techniques can be divided into three categories with no clear-cut boundaries 
between them. Some explanation and typical examples for these categories are presented as 
follows (Vincke, 1992).  
1) Multiple attributes utility theory, which aggregates different points of view into one 
function, and then, optimizes this function. The additive model and AHP (Saaty, 1980, 1982, 
2001) are two typical techniques in this category.    
2) Outranking methods, which aim to build an outranking relation based on the DM’s 
preferences. The ELECTRE (I, II, III, IV) method (Roy 1968, 1981, 1989, 1996, 2005) is 
one of the most famous MCDM outranking techniques.   
 23
3) Interactive methods, which tries to derive judgments by tracing, alternating, and 
dialoguing calculation steps. Through the interactions between the DM and MCDM 
problem formulations, solutions are iteratively adjusted and updated till satisfactory 
resolutions are finally obtained.  
In the next two sections, two representative MCDM techniques, AHP and ELECTRE, 
are explained in detail. These two methods are then adapted later to elicit preferences for 
graph models in Chapters 4 and 5, respectively.  
 
3.2. Analytical Hierarchy Process 
Capable of handling not only quantitative but also qualitative criteria during a 
decision-making process, the Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) (Saaty, 1980, 1982, 2001) 
is a widely utilized multicriteria decision making technique that allows a DM to structure 
his or her decisions hierarchically and accommodates his or her personal experience, 
logical judgment, and even individual imaginations in the decision-making process. The 
major idea underlying AHP is to streamline complex decision problems by breaking them 
down into hierarchies with fundamental elements. Usually, a typical hierarchy includes four 
levels. 1) A focus level, specifying the overall objective of the decision problem. 2) A factor 
level, also called a criteria level, identifying all important criteria. 3) A sub-criteria level, 
used in some complicated situations in order to provide more detailed insights of certain 
criteria. For extremely complex cases, there may exist several sub-criteria levels. 4) An 





Figure 3.1 A typical AHP structure. 
 
 Next, pairwise comparison matrices are constructed for each element at the same level. 
The matrices contain the relative priorities of elements. Note that at different levels, these 
elements represent different objects: criteria, sub-criteria, or alternatives. For example, for 
a certain criterion (or sub-criterion) X with n elements below it: 1 2, ,..., nY Y Y , a pairwise 
comparison matrix can be made as illustrated in Table 3.1. In this matrix, /ij i jy w w=  
provides the pairwise comparison result of element iY  over jY  with respect to element X, 
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where ( )1,2,...,iw i n=  are the derived scale values. Therefore, it is natural to have: 1) 
11 22 ... 1nny y y= = = = ; and 2) 1/ij jiy y= ( , 1, 2,...,i j n= ). 
 
Table 3.1. A sample matrix for pairwise comparison 
X 1Y  2Y  … nY  
1Y  11y 12y … 1ny
2Y  21y 22y … 2ny
… … … …  
nY  1ny 2ny … nny
 
 
 In AHP, a scale of “1” to “9” is adopted to conduct a non-quantitative pairwise 
comparison of two elements (Saaty, 1980, 1982, 2001). In this scale system, “1” indicates 
equal importance of two elements contributing to the upper level property, “9” means 
absolute importance of one element over another, and a value between “1” and “9” 
provides an in-between importance measurement of one element over another. Detailed 
descriptions of the 9-scale measurement system are shown in Table 3.2 (Saaty 1980, 1982, 
2001). In the last decade, many concerns, such as weakness in the symmetry of negative 
and positive knowledge perception, have been raised about the 9-scale system. Therefore, 
alternative scale systems were developed (Ma and Zheng, 1991; Donegan et al., 1992). In 
this thesis, priority calculations are first carried out with the traditional 9-scale system, and 
then, verified with two popular alternative scales (Beynon, 2002). The results are discussed 
in the case study section of Chapter 4. 
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Table 3.2 The pairwise comparison scale 
(Saaty, 1982, 2001; Saaty and Vargas, 2006)  
Intensity of 
Importance Definition Explanation 
1 Equal importance of both 
elements 
Two elements contribute equally to the 
property  
3 Weak importance of one element 
over another 
Experience and judgment slightly favor 
one element over another 
5 Essential or strong importance of 
one element over another 
Experience and judgment strongly favor 
one element over another 
7 Demonstrated importance of one 
element over another 
An element is strongly favored and its 
dominance is demonstrated in practice 
9 Absolute importance of one 
element over another  
The evidence favoring one element over 
another is of the highest possible order 
of affirmation 
2,4,6,8 Intermediate values between two 
adjacent judgments 
Compromise is needed between two 
judgments 
Reciprocals If activity i has one of the 
preceding numbers assigned to it 
when compared with activity j, 
the j has the reciprocal value 
whe3n compared with i 
A reasonable assumption 
Rationales Ratios arising from the scale If consistency were to be forced by 




 After the establishment of the pairwise comparison matrices, a so-called eigenvalue 
technique is employed to calculate the weights of overall relative priorities for each 
element. According to the linear algebra, the largest or principal eigenvalue of the pairwise 
matrix, maxλ , can be calculated by: 
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⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟
⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠
 
where ( )1 2, ,...,
T
nw w w w=  is the priority vector for the pairwise matrix. 
The consistency of the comparison matrices is tracked by a Consistency Ratio (CR), 
which is obtained by comparing the consistency index CI and the random inconsistency 













and RI is given by the values shown in Table 3.3. 
 
 
Table 3.3 Random inconsistency for different sizes of matrices 
(Saaty, 1982, 2001; Saaty and Vargas, 2006) 
n 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Random Inconsistency Index (RI) 0 0 0.52 0.89 1.11 1.25 1.35 1.40 1.45 1.49
 
 
Additionally, according to Saaty (1995), the consistency ratio should be less than 5%, 
8%, and 10% for a 3×3 matrix, a 4×4 matrix, and matrices of higher orders, respectively. 
Within this interval, the judgmental consistency level is acceptable, and the corresponding 
matrices are said to be consistent. Finally, by a linear additive aggregation procedure, the 
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global priority of each element relative to the overall objective is derived based on all the 
weights generated in the previous procedure.  
However, when dealing with many decision problems in the real world, due to the 
involving interactions and dependence of elements from different levels, the problems can 
not be modeled simply by hierarchical structure (Saaty and Vargas, 2006). Therefore, a new 
approach, named Analytical Network Process (ANP), is developed by Saaty (1996, 2001, 
2005). Figure 3.2 illustrates the differences between a linear hierarchy and a nonlinear 
network. In stead of a simple top-down hierarchy, a feedback network contains a more 
complicated structure, which involves all direction connections, cycles between clusters, 
and loops within the same cluster. For the detailed explanations and calculations for ANP 
approach, readers are referred to Saaty (1996, 2001, 2005) and Saaty and Vargas (2006). 
 
 
   
 Figure 3.2 Structural differences between a linear hierarchy and a nonlinear Network (Saaty, 2006) 
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3.3. ELECTRE III 
The term ELECTRE stands for Elimination and Choice Expressing the Reality. The 
methods were firstly introduced by Roy in the mid-60 (Roy, 1968). Subsequently, in the 
following decades, several versions of this method were established and improved. Since 
1966, ELECTRE I, Iv, IS, II, III, IV, A, and TRI have been developed, and now, the 
methods are still being refined. Table 3.4 explains the main characteristics of ELECTRE 
methods. For more details of ELECTRE methods, readers are referred to Roy (1991, 2005) 
and Roy and Vanderpooten (1996). In this section, as the basis of the research presented in 
chapter 5, the method of ELECTRE III is discussed in detail.  
By taking indifference and preference thresholds into account, ELECTRE III considers 
a fuzzy binary outranking relation. It defines a series of algorithms in order to obtain the 
outranking degree aRb  or ( ),R a b , representing the degree of outranking credibility of a 
over b. The pseudo-criterion ig , a basic element involved in this method, shows the linear 
preference with indifference threshold iq  and preference threshold ip .  
A normalized weight iw  is assigned to each pseudo-criterion. Thus, the concordance 
index aCb  or ( ),C a b  can be calculated as: 






C a b p c a b
W =








=∑  and 
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Next, a veto threshold iv  is introduced for each pseudo-criterion such that any 
credibility for the outranking of b by a is refused if  
( ) ( ) ( )( )i i i ig b g a v g a≥ + , 
even when all the other criteria have the credibility for b outranking by a.  
Now the discordance index iad b  or ( ),id a b , for each criterion i, is defined by: 
( )
( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( )( )
1 if ;
, 0 if ;
linear between the two.
i i i i
i i i i i
g b g a p g a






Finally, the degree of outranking can be computed by 
( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )( )( ),






i I a b
C a b d a b C a b i




⎪= −⎨ ⋅⎪ −⎩
∏
 
where ( ),I a b  is the set of criteria that satisfies ( ) ( ), ,id a b C a b>  (Roy 1991, 2005; 
Vincke, 1992). 
In Chapter 5, a fuzzy MCDM model based on ELECTRE III is implemented as a 
three-layer hierarchical model for eliciting relative preferences for conflict models in graph 




The basic concepts of multiple criteria decision making, emphasizing on two specific 
techniques, AHP and ELECTRE, are introduced in this chapter. The following chapters 
propose two preference elicitation approaches based on different MCDM techniques: 1) an 







Integrated AHP Approach for Preference 






The purpose of this research is to develop an integrated conflict analysis approach (Ke 
et al., 2007), which combines an Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) (Saaty, 1980, 1982, 
2001) preference ranking method with GMCR (Fang et al., 1993). As introduced in Chapter 
2, GMCR is a systematic procedure that handles complicated strategic decision problems 
involving two or more DMs with differing objectives as reflected by their diverse 
preferences over possible states or outcomes. Due to its simplicity and flexibility, the graph 
model enables interested parties or an analyst to analyze a conflict and obtain a better 
understanding about what is currently happening and what could eventually take place 
(Fang et al., 1993).  
At the modeling stage of GMCR, the determination of relative preferences for each 
DM is one of the most important elements, as each involved party usually has different 
preferences over options, situations, and/or states. A compromise or consensus, if any, will 
 
 34
be achieved according to these preferences. From each DM’s standpoint, it is inevitably 
appealing to consider multiple criteria when preferences are ranked over feasible states. If 
each state is regarded as a decision alternative in the ranking process, preference elicitation 
can be naturally treated as a typical multiple criteria decision making (MCDA) problem.  
As a useful MCDA technique, AHP (Saaty, 1980, 1993, 2001) provides a mathematical 
procedure to take both quantitative and qualitative criteria into consideration in ranking 
decision alternatives. An introduction for AHP can be found in Chapter 3. In this chapter, an 
integrated AHP approach is constructed to elicit preference rankings for each DM, which 
are then fed into a DSS, such as GMCR II (Fang et al., 2003a, 2003b), to carry out a 
standard graph model stability analysis. 
This approach is then employed to investigate the Canadian west coast port congestion 
dispute. The Canadian west coast has historically been an important gateway connecting 
North America to Asia, thanks to its specific geographical and strategic location. Despite 
successful operations and maintenance of the port facilities to handle international trade 
during the past decades, the west coast is now facing increasing congestion problems, 
resulting in significant delays in transporting goods from the west coast to other parts of 
Canada and the USA. The strategic analyses carried out in this research suggest potential 
resolutions in which Canada would expand port facilities at various locations, encouraging 






 This section proposes an AHP model for eliciting relative preferences over feasible 
states in a graph model. Figure 4.1 provides a simple comparison between the adapted 
version and the standard AHP approach. With a similar hierarchical structure, instead of the 
criteria level, the new approach introduces an influence power level. Through each DM’s 
impact on his/her courses of action by different power strength, the DM’s preferences thus 
influence the entire conflict situation. More specifically, the structure of the adapted AHP 
approach is depicted by Figure 4.2. Detailed explanations are given next for the four 










Figure 4.2 Structure of the adapted AHP approach. 
 
 
1) The Preference Ranking level contains all DMs considered in the conflict model. 
Instead of only one objective as in the standard AHP approach, this level specifies that the 
objectives are to obtain preference rankings for all DMs. Then, the preference analysis 
contains in the following steps will be carried out from each DM’s viewpoint separately.  
2) As mentioned above, the influence power level furnishes different DMs’ influence 
powers over the entire situation from each DM’s standpoint. By the same pairwise matrix 
and eigenvalue technique as the traditional AHP, a weight list is obtained to illustrate the 
power strength for all DMs based on a certain DM’s assessment.  
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3) The option level lists all options under each DM’s control. At this level, priority 
weights of all options will be obtained. Moreover, comparisons can be further decomposed 
into a sub-hierarchy model if the complexity of the problem warrants. 
4) The action/state level displays a series of action profiles, characterized by 
combinations of “N” and “Y” against the options, where an “N” indicates a corresponding 
option is not chosen and a “Y” stands for the option being selected. The overall preference 
ranking is thus determined by multiplying option priority weights and action status. After 
all DMs’ relative preferences are elicited, they are then fed into GMCR II for further 
stability analyses. 
 
4.2. Case study: Canadian West Coast Congestion Problem 
Traffic congestions always have significant impact on the entire supply chain 
operations (Sankaran et al., 2005). Currently, the Canadian west coast is facing increasing 
congestion problems caused by the recent exploding increase in the trading volume with 
Asia, especially, China. This serious congestion results in significant delays either in 
receiving goods from other countries, or in transporting goods from the west coast to other 
parts of Canada and USA. For example, Canada’s largest west coast port, located in 
Vancouver, had increases in total tonnage and container volume of 21.2% and 21.8%, 
respectively, in 2005, when compared to 2002. These numbers are expected to keep 
growing even more rapidly in the foreseeable future. By 2020, the container cargo through 
British Columbian ports and the value of this trade are projected to expand to 5 to 7 million 
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containers and $75 billion, increasing by about 300% and 114%, respectively (Government 
of Canada, 2005). The booming container traffic has strained the existing Canadian west 
coast port system. At the same time, the US west coast ports are also experiencing a similar 
bottleneck situation. Seattle, for instance, is the fastest-growing port in North America. 
From 2004 to 2005, its box volume has risen by 18% to more than 2 million TEUs 
(20-ft-equivalent units). In response to the volume growth, Seattle expects to increase its 
processing capacity by 10% after a new terminal project is completed by 2008 (Ryan, 
2006a). Such expansions are taking place in other locations along the US west coast, such 
as Los Angeles and San Diego, as well as some east coast ports. Nevertheless, the expanded 




Generally, the west coast of Canada refers to British Columbia (BC), the westernmost 
Canadian province. As the key connection point in the Asia-Pacific Gateway, the BC port 
system has always been and will continue to be one of the most critical aspects of the 
economic future of Canada, and even the entire North American continent. Nevertheless, 
the recent booming trade between Asian countries and North America has brought serious 
concerns to all Canadian west coast ports. The Port of Vancouver, Canada’s largest and 
most diversified port, for example, is already handling a significantly large container 
business of 1,767,379 TEUs in 2005, which is forecasted to be tripled within 15 years 
(Ryan, 2006a). But the existing port capacity will never be able to handle such a massive 
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amount. Some statistical data provide further description of this situation: the world gross 
domestic product in the past twenty years has increased 2.8% annually; global container 
trade has increased about 9% annually; more than 140 jumbo containerships of 
8,000-10,000 capacity will be sailing on the world’s oceans within five years. These 
capacity crises, due to exponentially increasing trading, are faced by all Canadian ports and 
generate immense pressure on Canadian transportation systems. Norman Stark, President 
and CEO of TSI Terminal Systems, put forward the following five issues in September 
2005, when attending the annual Port Days Conference (Smyrlis, 2005): 1) congested 
terminals; 2) shortage of longshore labour; 3) strained road and rail infrastructure; 4) 
scarcity land for port expansions; and 5) increasing investment costs. Each issue poses a 
real challenge to Canada. 
Meanwhile, the US ports are also experiencing a serious congestion situation. A supply 
chain directions report in 2005 (Eye for Transport, 2005) indicates that port congestion is a 
major concern of the supply chain industry. The huge amounts of international trading are 
“straining the supporting infrastructure” and significantly delaying all activities within 
supply chains (Sowinski, 2007). Pennsylvania State University recently studied 24 major 
US and Canadian ports and stated that west coast ports are underestimating expected future 
container volumes by as many as 11 million TEUs in 2015. “Delays due to congestion at 
west coast ports could then cause a domino effect” (Ryan, 2006a). 
Facing all these challenges, Canadians have also come to realize some opportunities. 
As Stephen Poloz, Senior Vice-president, Corporate Affairs and Chief Economist of the 
Export Development Corporation (EDC) indicated (Ryan, 2006b), “Over the next five years, 
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port capacity in Asia is slated to double. But in the United States, a lot of investments (since 
9/11) are being funneled into security rather than capacity.” Accordingly, it is possible for 
Canadian ports to act as “a facilitator of US trade”. Therefore, a key purpose of this section 
is to facilitate Canada in seeking opportunities for maximizing its benefit from this role. 
 In the next section, a graph model, integrated with an integrated AHP preference 
ranking approach, is established regarding the conflict among different parties revolving 
around the west coast congestion problem. All major DMs, options, and relevant 
preferences will be discussed and investigated. 
 
4.2.2. Model description 
The point in time that was selected is the beginning of October 2006. Four DMs are 
considered in this model: Canadian government (CA), United States government (US), 
Chinese government (CN), and Traders. DMs and their corresponding options are listed in 
Table 4.1.  
 
Table 4.1 DMs and corresponding options 
DMs Options 
Canadian government (CA) 
1. PPR: Expansion plan in the Port of Prince Rupert 
2. PV: Expansion plan in the Port of Vancouver 
3. OP: Other ports, either west or east coast ports 
United States government  
(US) 
4. EX: Expansion plan for its own ports 
5. OS: Other solutions, such as shift cargo operations to off-peak hours
Chinese government (CN) 6. MS: Develop own superport in Mexico 
Traders (TD) 
7. US: US gateway 
8. CA: Canadian gateway 






China is selected to be the representative for all fast-growing Asian trading partners, as 
China has now become one of the world’s biggest economies due to its efficient labour 
costs. For instance, at the Port of Vancouver, China accounted for the highest trading 
tonnage of 16,310,000 metric tons and the highest container tonnage of 6,187,000 metric 
tons in 2005, increasing by 95.0% and 73.5% from the 2002 statistics, respectively (Port of 
Vancouver, 2002, 2005). As one of the DMs, Traders refer to all shippers involved in this 
problem, such as manufacturers, exporters, importers, carriers, and third-party logistics 
providers. 
 
4.2.3. Feasible state generation 
Except for China, each DM has to choose at least one option: Canada has to expand its 
port capacities in one location or another in response to the rising container volume; the US 
has to either expand its own port capacity or find other solutions to relieve the bottleneck 
situation; and Traders have to choose a gateway for their current and future trade. 
As for the “Option dependence” method embedded in GMCR II, Traders would like to 
choose US as the gateway only if US expands its own ports, to choose CA as the gateway 
only if Canada addresses its expansion plan in one of its three options, and to choose 
Mexico as the gateway unless China builds its own superport there. By using the foregoing 





4.2.4. Preference ranking using the integrated AHP approach 
Based on the list of DMs and options in Table 4.1, a hierarchy structure of this conflict 
model is given in Figure 4.3, which is employed to elicit relative preference rankings for 
each DM as explained below. Note that the consistency of all calculations are confirmed 









4.2.4.1. Canada’s standpoint 
From Canada’s standpoint, US is the most powerful DM, followed by Canada, then 
China, and with Traders exerting least control over the situation. Accordingly, the 
following pairwise comparison matrix is adopted and the ranking result (weights) for 
influence powers is shown in Table 4.2. 
 
Table 4.2 Pairwise comparison matrix for influence powers from Canada’s standpoint 
 CA US CN TD Weight
CA 1 1/5 3 5 0.204
US 5 1 7 9 0.661
CN 1/3 1/7 1 2 0.084




At the option level, the expansion of the Port of Vancouver is definitely the first choice 
for Canada as Vancouver is Canada’s flagship port and the most diversified port on the 
continent (Pacific Gateway Portal, 2006). As a matter of fact, Vancouver had planned to 
construct a third berth at Deltaport at Roberts Back to increase its capacity by 400,000 
TEUs to 1.3 million TEUs. But the federal government recently delayed this construction 
and requested more environmental impact studies (Ryan, 2006a). 
Due to its strategic location and potential to offer efficient access to the North 
American market, the Port of Prince Rupert becomes another alternative. In fact, the 
Government of Canada already had the intent to build a container terminal there (Industry 
Canada, 2005). Some extra special features of the Port of Prince Rupert attract more 
attention from different parties. For example, its deep natural harbour provides the 
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possibility of handling jumbo containerships; sailing times from Prince Rupert to China’s 
main ports are about 24 to 60 hours shorter than from other west coast ports (Ryan, 2005); 
it has the safest west coast harbour with extensive capacity to expand (Prince Rupert Port 
Authority, 2006). However, this alternative also faces many obstacles. The main issues 
include: 1) Remoteness of the location. Prince Rupert is about 500 miles north to 
Vancouver; 2) Lack of infrastructure. The Canadian National Railway (CNR) provides the 
only land connection to the port; 3) Aboriginal issues. A tribal group has threatened to file 
lawsuits to stop the progress of the port expansion plan due to the violation of aboriginal 
land rights; 4) Some shipping lines are reluctant to add this port into their shipping routes 
because of additional piloting costs (Machalaba, 2006; Ryan, 2006a). 
Besides these two west coast ports, other Canadian ports have also gained interests 
recently. It is known that the Ports of Montreal and Halifax have started to handle 
significant container businesses originating from the US Midwest (Ryan, 2006b). 
Furthermore, their geographic locations and existing surplus capacities provide them with 
competitive advantages over other alternatives. For example, the Port of Halifax has 
enough capacity to handle up to around 1.2M TEU containers a year, while it only took care 
of 550,000 TEU in 2005 (Asia Pacific Bulletin, 2006). 
With respect to the US’s options, it does not really matter for Canada if US chooses to 
expand its own ports or find some other solutions for the congestion problem. When it 
comes to Traders’ options, the most important concern for Canada is that they choose 
Canada as one of their trading gateways. The other two choices, US and Mexico gateways, 
are much less preferred and do not make much difference for Canada. The pairwise 
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comparison matrices for all these options for each DM are then constructed, and the 
ranking weights are also calculated as shown in Table 4.3. 
  
Table 4.3 Pairwise comparison matrices for each DM’s options from Canada’s standpoint 
 
CA PR PV OP Weights
PR 1 1/3 3 0.268 
PV 3 1 4 0.614 
OP 1/3 1/4 1 0.117 
a) CA’s options 
 
US EX OS Weights
EX 1 1 0.500 
OS 1 1 0.500 
b) US’s options 
 
TD US CA ME Weights
US 1 1/7 1 0.111 
CA 7 1 7 0.778 
ME 1 1/7 1 0.111 
c) Traders’ options 
 
 
4.2.4.2. US’s standpoint  
Table 4.4 provides the pairwise comparison matrix and ranking results for influence 
power from US’s viewpoint. US thinks itself as the most powerful DM, China slightly more 
powerful than Canada due to its rapid growth and its increasing impacts on the world trade, 
and Canada somewhat more powerful than the Traders.  
 
Table 4.4 Pairwise comparison matrix for influence powers from US’s standpoint 
 
 CA US CN TD Weight
CA 1 1/3 1/2 2 0.159
US 3 1 3 4 0.510
CN 2 1/3 1 2 0.226




At the option level, for the US, the Port of Prince Rupert is the most preferred, 
followed by the Port of Vancouver, and then other ports. Although the Port of Prince Rupert 
is remotely located in Northern BC, the railway system provides a direct link to Chicago 
with very few stops on the way. Therefore, the rail-transit time is likely about the same as 
the land route from Los Angeles to Chicago, even with a longer distance (Machalaba, 2006). 
By squeezing out unnecessary delays at other crowded ports, the entire transportation time 
from China to the US Midwest might possibly be reduced from 35-40 days to only about 20 
days if the route via the Port of Prince Rupert is taken (Pitts, 2006). 
In order to capture the booming Asian trade, US has to expand its own ports, especially 
its west coast ports, such as Los Angeles-Long Beach ports and Seattle-Tacoma ports, 
which handled more than 87 percent of the west coast’s container volume in 2006 
(Sowinski, 2007). However, due to the extremely expensive investment of expansion, some 
other approaches might be helpful. For instance, the Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach 
were trying to shift cargo operations to off-peak hours in order to avoid serious congestions 
(Eye for Transport, 2005).  
As for the options of Traders, US most prefers that they choose US as the gateway so it 
can capture more profits than Canada. Mexico would be the last choice due to the lack of 
supporting infrastructure, particularly transportation systems. 
The pairwise comparison and ranking results for each DM’s options from the US 







Table 4.5 Pairwise comparison matrices for each DM’s options from US’s standpoint 
 
CA PR PV OP Weights
PR 1 3 4 0.614 
PV 1/3 1 3 0.268 
OP 1/4 1/3 1 0.117 
a) Canada’s options 
 
US EX OS Weights
EX 1 2 0.667 
OS 1/2 1 0.333 
b) US’s options 
 
TD US CA ME Weights
US 1 2 4 0.558 
CA 1/2 1 3 0.320 
ME 1/4 1/3 1 0.122 
c) Traders’ options 
 
 
4.2.4.3. China’s standpoint 
The Chinese government thinks the order of DMs’ influence power from most to least 
is US, China, Canada, and Traders (Table 4.6). 
 
Table 4.6 Pairwise comparison matrix for influence powers from China’s standpoint 
 
 CA US CN TD Weight
CA 1 1/4 1/2 2 0.143
US 4 1 2 6 0.526
CN 2 1/2 1 2 0.240
TD 1/2 1/6 1/2 1 0.092
 
 
From the point of view of the Chinese government, for Canadian ports, the Port of 
Prince Rupert, due to its shortest distance to Asia and future expansion potentials, naturally 
becomes the best alternative. Vancouver Port would be the second choice because of its 
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existing container capacity and handling experience. In addition, some east coast ports, 
such as Halifax, also gain attention from China for the possibility of bypassing congestion 
on the west coast. For China, whatever US does, either expands ports or explores other 
methods, does not make any difference, as long as the serious bottleneck situation can be 
lessened so that their goods would be transported to their destinations instead of simply 
being piled up on the west coast. Building their own deep-water superport in Mexico is 
another potential resolution for China (Pitts, 2006). Therefore, the relative preference 
rankings for each DM’s options from China’s viewpoint are derived as shown in Table 4.7. 
 
 
Table 4.7 Pairwise comparison matrices for each DM’s options from China’s standpoint 
 
CA PR PV OP Weights
PR 1 2 4 0.571 
PV 1/2 1 2 0.286 
OP 1/4 1/2 1 0.143 
a) Canada’s options 
 
US EX OS Weights
EX 1 1 0.500 
OS 1 1 0.500 
b) US’s options 
 
TD US CA ME Weights
US 1 1/3 1/2 0.163 
CA 3 1 2 0.540 
ME 2 1/2 1 0.297 
c) Traders’ options 
 
 
4.2.4.4. Traders’ standpoint 
From Traders’ standpoint, US, again, is the most powerful party, then followed by 




Table 4.8 Pairwise comparison matrix for influence powers from Traders’ standpoint 
 
 CA US CN TD Weight
CA 1 1/2 2 1 0.224
US 2 1 4 2 0.449
CN 1/2 1/4 1 1 0.136
TD 1 1/2 1 1 0.191
 
 
Table 4.9 Pairwise comparison matrices for each DM’s options from Traders’ standpoint 
 
CA PR PV OP Weights
PR 1 3 2 0.550 
PV 1/3 1 1 0.210 
OP 1/2 1 1 0.240 
a) Canada’s options 
 
US EX OS Weights
EX 1 1 0.500 
OS 1 1 0.500 
b) US’s options 
 
TD US CA ME Weights
US 1 1/2 2 0.311 
CA 2 1 2 0.493 
ME 1/2 1/2 1 0.196 
c) Traders’ options 
 
 
For Traders, any port that can handle their goods would be attractive. As their goods 
shipped to US west coast ports are being piled higher and higher, Canadian ports are 
definitely good choices, especially the Port of Prince Rupert. Furthermore, for the reason of 
capacity surplus, some Canadian east coast ports gain more attentions from different 
Traders than the Port of Vancouver. Again, to the extent that the west coast congestion 
problem is solved, the two options controlled by US are essentially the same to Traders too. 
Moreover, since US already has a much more developed infrastructure system than Mexico, 
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it is a better gateway choice than Mexico, unless China develops its own deep-water 
superports in Mexico (Pitts, 2006). The pairwise comparison matrices and the 
corresponding weights for each DM’s options from Traders’ standpoint can hence be 
obtained as illustrated in Table 4.9. 
 
 
4.2.4.5. Overall ranking 
By aggregating results obtained from each individual DM’s perspective, the overall 
ranking weights are listed in Table 4.10. As mentioned above, the weights for the 
Actions/States level are calculated by multiplying the related influence power with the 
option weight. For example, the Action/State weight for Canada choosing to expand the 




Table 4.10 Overall ranking weights 
 
CA US CN TD 
















PR 0.268 0.055 0.614 0.098 0.571 0.082 0.550 0.123 





















CN MS 0.084  1.000 0.084 0.226 1.000 0.226 0.240 1.000 0.240 0.136  1.000 0.136 
US 0.111 0.006 0.558 0.058 0.163 0.015 0.311  0.059 
















Now, all feasible states are treated as 105 alternatives and ranked accordingly in the 
integrated AHP framework from each DM’s perspective. The preference rankings are then 
input into the GMCR II to conduct stability analyses, which provide a wide range of 
individual stability and equilibrium information for each state under different solution 
concepts.  
 
4.2.5. Stability analysis 
Table 4.11 displays the predicted equilibria from the GMCR II analysis, corresponding 
to possible resolutions, given the preference profiles generated in the last subsection. These 
two resolutions are stable for all solution concepts. For these two equilibria, there exist 
three distinct commonalities: 1) Canada performs expansion plans in all of its three options; 
2) China builds its superport in Mexico; and 3) Traders continue choosing Canada as one of 
their trade gateways.  
 
 
Table 4.11 Possible resolutions for the Canadian West Coast Congestion Problem 
 
 84 98
CA:    
1. PPR Y Y 
2. PV Y Y 
3. OP Y Y 
US   
4. EX N Y 
5. OS Y N 
CN 
6. MS Y Y 
TD   
7. US N Y 
8. CA Y Y 





As far as Canada’s concerns, this is exactly what happened after the point in time that 
this model was built. According to CBC Canada, on October 11, 2006, Canadian Prime 
Minister Stephen Harper announced a $591 million investment over the next eight years on 
ports, roads, rails and other infrastructure to improve trading access to Asia-Pacific markets 
(Theodore, 2006). Particularly, the expansion plan includes a $28 million investment over 
four years to improve cargo screening at the Prince Rupert Port Authority (Prince Rupert 
Port Authority, 2006) and a high-tech system that will cost up to $152 million to promote 
more efficient and seamless transportation at the Port of Vancouver (Port Vancouver 
Authority, 2006). In the meantime, China has been working actively to open and develop 
NAFTA shipping ports in Mexico (Corsi, 2006). In order to further smooth the flow of 
international trade through Canada’s west coast, an additional $233.5 million “Asia-Pacific 
Gateway and Corridor Transportation Infrastructure Fund” is promised to improve the road 
and rail connections (Prince Rupert Port Authority, 2006; Brooks, 2007). On June 1, 2007, 
in a speech to the 70th annual conference on the Federation of Canadian Municipalities, 
Prime Minister announced a $33-billion infrastructure funding plan, among which one of 
the most critical projects is “the Asia-Pacific gateway and Corridor Initiative to Canada into 
the booming Far East through the West Coast ports” (Office of the Prime Minister, 2007). 
In October 2007, the Speech from the Throne further confirmed an infrastructure program, 
the Building Canada Plan, to support Canada’s long-term growth by investing in the 
transport and trade hubs (Government of Canada, 2007).  
In the meantime, China has been working actively to open and develop NAFTA 
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shipping ports in Mexico (Corsi, 2006). A China-Mexico trade route highlighted on the 
North American Inland Ports Network (NAIPN) website (2007) shows a route crossing the 
Pacific Ocean from China to Mexico at the ports of Manzanillo and Lazaro Cardenas, and 
then entering the US through San Antonio. 
 
4.2.6. Status quo analysis 
 
Table 4.12 State transition from the status quo to state 98 
 
Status Quo  Transitional States  Equilibrium  
44  49  63  98 
CA:         
1. PPR N Y  Y  Y 
2. PV Y  Y  Y  Y 
3. OP N Y  Y  Y 
US        
4. EX Y  Y  Y  Y 
5. OS N  N  N  N 
CN        
6. MS N  N Y  Y 
TD        
7. US Y  Y  Y  Y 
8. CA Y  Y  Y  Y 
9. ME N  N  N Y 
 
 
As one of the most important research topics in GMCR, status quo analysis is used to 
track the moves and countermoves of conflict problems starting from the status quo, 
passing through transitional states, and finally, reaching the outcomes or equilibria (Li, 
2003; Li et al., 2004). The status quo of this case is state 44. At this state, 1) Canada only 
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carries out the expansion plan in the Port of Vancouver; 2) US expands its own ports; 3) 
China does not build the superport in Mexico; and 4) Traders choose US and Canada as 
their trade gateways. Consider one of the possible resolutions, state 98, Table 4.12 
illustrates the conflict evolves from the status quo to this state. As shown in the table, one 
can see that from the status quo, Canada takes the first move from state 44 to 49 by 
carrying out the expansion plans in all ports. Then, China decides to build the superport in 
Mexico in order to facilitate the increasing international trade. Finally, Traders extend their 
choices of gateway to all three options. 
 
4.2.7. Further Discussion 
As outlined by Saaty (1995), consistency ratios should be less than 5%, 8%, and 10% 
for 3×3, 4×4, and higher-order matrices, respectively. For all of the pairwise matrices 
presented earlier (Tables 4.2 - 4.9), Saaty’s original 1-9 scale system is employed. 
Analytical results confirm that most of the consistency ratios satisfy these requirements 
except for two 3×3 matrices (Tables 4.3.a and 4.5.a), which yield a consistency ratio of 
0.07.  
Accordingly, two alternative scales discussed by Beynon (2002) were employed to 
execute sensitivity analyses. Beynon (2002) indicates that the original 1-9 scale may exhibit 
its weakness in the presence of the symmetry of negative and positive knowledge 
perceptions, whereas alternative scales offer some certain benefits in this case. Therefore, 
preference priorities are re-calculated with the following two suggested alternative scales: 
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1) ‘9/9-9/1’ scales (Ma and Zheng, 1991), namely ( )9 / 10 k− , with 1,...,9k = ; 
2) φ  mapping (Donegan et al., 1992), where the relevant scales satisfy 
1 1: exp tanh
9
kkφ −⎛ − ⎞⎛ ⎞→ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟
⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
, with 1,...,9k = . 
With these two new scales, all consistency ratios are effectively controlled within the 
threshold of 0.05. Recalculations with these alternative scale systems result in nearly 
identical state rankings (preferences), and the final equilibria remain the same as the 
original analysis. This sensitivity analysis confirms the consistency of our calculations and 
the robustness of this integrated approach.  
 
4.3. Summary 
In this chapter, the Canadian west coast congestion problem is analyzed from a 
conflict-analysis perspective. An integrated AHP approach is proposed to elicit preferences 
for each DM, and preference rankings are then fed into the conflict model within the 
framework of the DSS, GMCR II, for further stability analysis. This research sheds 
strategic insights into the conflict under consideration. Practically, the analysis suggests 
potential resolutions where Canada would expand its port facilities on the west coast, and 




Three-Layer Hierarchical Analysis  
Model for Relative Preference Ranking  






In this chapter, a three-layer hierarchical analysis approach, which utilizes a fuzzy 
multicriteria model of a specific MCDM technique called ELECTRE III (Roy, 1996), is 
presented to elicit relative preference information for ranking states. An extra action layer, 
embedded between the criterion and option layers, is introduced and serves as a bridge 
between the criterion and option layers in a conflict model. Thus, it clarifies the 
relationships between actions and options. By using criteria instead of only options, this 
hierarchical analysis model can assist users to reflect more precisely on a DM’s preferences 
or values and fully attain his or her standards of reasonableness in ranking states. Therefore, 
the result is more consistent and predictable. Moreover, by using the ELECTRE algorithm 
(Roy, 1968, 1989), it can handle quantitative as well as qualitative information. Hence, it 
improves the acquisition of relative preferences for each DM when employing the graph 
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model. The original idea of this three-layer hierarchical structure was put forward by De et 
al. (2002) and Fu (2003), but the procedure has been extensively revised and 
reprogrammed. 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. The three-layer hierarchical 
analysis model and relative preference calculation procedure are presented in detail within 
the next section. By applying this approach to a transportation negotiation problem between 
shipper and carrier, the practicality and effectiveness of this approach are illustrated. 
Conclusions and insights are provided in the final section. 
  
5.1. A Three-Layer Hierarchical Analysis Model   
As mentioned previously, the hierarchical structure introduced in this section 
constitutes an additional complementary approach for the graph model, which is used to 
generate the relative preferences for each DM. This preference information is required 
before a stability analysis of the calibrated model can be carried out to find the potential 
equilibria and obtain other strategic insights. Figure 5.1 presents the framework of this 
model. The criteria in this MCDM model reflect the value system or objectives of a 
specified DM while the states in the model are analogous to alternatives in a usual MCDM 
study. The following sub-sections explain details about this procedure.   
According to De et al. (2002) and Fu (2003), some concepts and definitions for this 
model are defined as follows: 
• A criterion is a standard, upon which a decision or judgment is based 






Figure 5.1 The framework of a three-layer hierarchical analysis model for relative preferences  





• An action is an operation that satisfies or does not satisfy with one of the criteria.  
• An option is a combination of actions.  
• A state is a combination of options, also called an alternative, for which a ranking 
of all states reflects the relative preferences of a given DM in the graph model for conflict 
resolution.  
 
5.1.1. Determination of criteria    
First, the objectives of a given DM should be obtained. In conflict situations, different 
DMs usually consider different, often contradictory, criteria to evaluate the alternatives. A 
set of criteria is determined according to the DM’s primary interest. Let 1 2{ , ,..., }mC c c c=  
denote the set of criteria, where m is the number of criteria. 
The overall objective for a DM is usually conceptual and immeasurable. Hence, a 
hierarchical analysis of criteria may be employed to break down the objectives into 
different levels or degrees in order to reach clearly measurable criteria (Levy et al., 2000). 
To simplify the explanation for the preference elicitation model developed in this chapter, 
all of the criteria are assumed to be at the lowest level.  
 
5.1.2. Identification of actions   
 The main distinction between an action and an option in this model is that the former is 
directly or closely related with each criterion and can be identified as a sub-object that 
satisfies a specific criterion or a set of criteria, while the latter is more compressed and 
formed by different combinations of actions. Therefore, the set of actions is generated 
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based on each criterion and the background information of the modeled conflict. Since 
additional actions will not affect the final ranking result, all those actions that are unrelated 
with the options will automatically be eliminated during the evaluation stage. Let 
1 2{ , ,..., }kA a a a=  and 1 2{ , ,..., }nO o o o=  represent the set of actions and options, 
respectively, where k is the number of actions and n is the number of options. 
  
5.1.3. Construction of the three-layer structure   
Figure 5.2 graphically portrays how the three-layer relationship structure connecting 
preference criteria via actions to options is constructed. Three sets of variables are put 
together to build a three-layer structure where each node stands for an element in the 
corresponding set and the arcs represent the relationships among them. From left to right, 
the order of the layers is criterion layer, action layer and option layer.   
The construction of the relationships between criteria and actions is not difficult, 
because an action is a sub-criterion from the criteria’s point of view. The identification of 
each action is based on its relationship with criteria. On the other hand, from the option 
layer’s viewpoint, an action can be treated as a “sub-option”. An action may not exist 
independently in the real world, but it is a direct solution to its corresponding criterion or 
criteria. Let { }1 1 1 2CA , ,..., m kc a c a c a=  denote the set of relationships between the criterion 
and action layers, and { }1 1 1 2AO , ,..., k na o a o a o=  stand for the set of relationships between 
the action and option layers, where m is the number of criteria, k is the number of actions, 











Figure 5.2 Construction of the Three-layer Relationship Structure 
(adapted from Fu (2003)) 
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The importance of the various relationships is reflected by the weights determined 
from a specific DM’s viewpoint. In particular, for each CAi jc a ∈ , a normalized weight 









Similarly, normalized weights are also assigned to the relationships between actions and 










5.1.4. Synthesis of the evaluation matrix   
 For each criterion, the evaluation of each alternative value in the evaluation matrix is 
calculated using a linear relationship. States are the combinations of options which are 
either selected or not selected, as is done in GMCR. Let 1 2{ , ,..., }gS s s s=  represent the set 
of states, where g is the number of states. Thus, the corresponding evaluation of a certain 




it ij jh h
j h




ho : option h ( 1ho =  means option h is selected in a state; otherwise, 0ho = ); 
ijw : the weight between criterion ic  and action ja ; 
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' jhw : the weight between action ja  and option ho ; 
1 i m≤ ≤  and 1 t g≤ ≤ . 
The calculated value, itW , represents the value of each state corresponding to every 
criterion, which constitutes each entry of an m g× matrix. This specific matrix, denoted by 
EMW , is called the evaluation matrix. A general format of this matrix is depicted as: 
1
1 11 1 1
1
1
   ...      ...  
...
...
                  
... ...
... ... ... ... ...
... ...



























5.1.5. Calculation of the relative ranking of states  
After obtaining the evaluation matrix, a fuzzy MCDM methodology (De and Hipel, 
1987) based on ELECTRE III (Roy, 1989) is used to calculate the preference ranking, 
whereby states are ranked from most to least preferred for each DM and ties are allowed. 
Fuzzy set theory was first introduced by Zadeh (1965, 1973) and has subsequently become 
a highly popular technique for modeling uncertainty in many disciplines. Integrating a 
fuzzy approach into ELECTRE permits this methodology to handle both quantitative and 
non-quantitative criteria in the presence of uncertainty.  
As shown in Figure 5.3, the basic element of this methodology is a pseudo-criterion, 
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Figure 5.3 Pseudo-criterion 
 
Let ( )i iaf a W=  and ( )i ibf b W=  denote the corresponding evaluation of states as  
and bs ,  respectively, for a certain criterion i. Then, the fuzzy preference relation iaPb  is 
represented by: 
0, ( ) ( )




if f a f b
aPb




where ( ) ( ) ( )i ig z g f a f b= −⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦  and ( ) ( )i if a f b−⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦  corresponds to the evaluation of 
states a and b, respectively, for a particular evaluation criterion i.  
Then, a pseudo-criterion is defined as:   
0, 0
( ) ( ) / , ( )
1, ( )
z q
g z z q p q z q p
z q p
≤ ≤⎧
⎪= − < ≤ +⎨
⎪ > +⎩
 
where p and q represent the preference threshold and indifference threshold, respectively. 
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Alternatives a and b are indifferent when ( ) ( )i if a f b−⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦  is smaller than q. The 
preference then increases gradually until ( ) ( )i if a f b−⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦  equals ( )q p+  and the 
preference becomes absolute if ( ) ( ) ( )i if a f b q p− ≥ +⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ .  
By employing this pseudo-criterion definition, the preference matrix for all states and 
criteria can then be constructed. The preference matrix contains the pairwise fuzzy 
preference relationship information, which is derived from the evaluation matrix mentioned 
earlier. For a certain criterion i, the preference matrix, denoted by MiP , can be depicted as: 
1
1




                  
1 1 ... 1 ... 1 ... 1
... ... ... ... ... ... ...
1 ... ... ...
... ... ... ... ... ... ...
1 ... ... ...





i i i i
i i i i
M
i
i i i i





P Pa Pb Pg
aP aPa aPb aPg
P
bP bPa bPb bPg
=
... ...













The next step, called aggregation of the preferences, is to measure the degree of 
preference allotted to one alternative over another considering the integrated view of all 
criteria. In order to reflect the weights or the importance of each criterion from a DM’s 








= ≤ ≤∑  
Then, for every criterion ic C∈ , the concordance-discordance index can be 
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determined by calculating two fuzzy relationships: fuzzy preference, iaPb , and fuzzy 
doubt, aDb . 
The concordance relation, aCb , represents the aggregated preference relation over all 






aCb w a b
=
=∑  
When all criteria have the same importance, i.e., 1 2
1... mw w w
m
= = = = , the 






a b a b
m =
= ∑  
Now, a veto threshold is introduced for each pseudo-criterion such that any credibility 
for the outranking of b by a is refused if  
( ) ( ) ( )i i i if b f a v f a≥ + ⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ . 
Then, the discordance index is calculated as: 
(a) ( ) ( ) [ ( )]Min 1, Max(0, )
[ ( )] [ ( )]
i i i i
i
i i i i
f b f a p f aad b
v f a p f a
⎡ ⎤⎧ ⎫− −
= ⎨ ⎬⎢ ⎥−⎩ ⎭⎣ ⎦
, when [ ( )] [ ( )] 0i i i iv f a p f a− ≠ ; 
(b) 1iad b = , when [ ( )] [ ( )] 0i i i iv f a p f a− = ; 
where ip  is the preference threshold and iv  is the veto threshold. When all the 
preference and veto thresholds are equal, the discordance index can be rewritten as: 
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(a) ( ) ( ) [ ( )]Min 1, Max(0, )




f b f a p f aad b
v f a p f a
⎡ ⎤⎧ ⎫− −
= ⎨ ⎬⎢ ⎥−⎩ ⎭⎣ ⎦
, when [ ( )] [ ( )] 0i iv f a p f a− ≠ ; 
(b) 1iad b = , when [ ( )] [ ( )] 0i iv f a p f a− = . 
Then, the aggregation of the discordance index forms a global index via a fuzzy logical 








= − −∏  
A final outranking relationships, aRb , obtained from the conjugation of both 
concordance and discordance relation, can be used to represent that alternative a is at least 
as good as alternative b, and does not cause any serious doubt towards the preference of a 
over b, with respect to every criterion.   










= ⋅⎨ ⎬−⎩ ⎭
∏ , *
when   for 1,2,...,  ;
for  = set of all  where .
i
i
ad b aCb i m




Finally, the equation ( )
k S k S
a aRk kRa
∈ ∈
Φ = −∑ ∑  is used to obtain the evaluation value 
over all states or alternatives considered in the preference ranking. The alternative with the 
highest ( )aΦ  value will rank first.   
 
5.1.6. Output of Preference Information 
Decision aid processes are never sequential, and hence, different phases in a model can 
be revised and recalculated. Therefore, the ranking results should be interpreted for 
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meaning and compared to the actual situation in the real world. One can carry out a 
sensitivity analysis by changing the weights and the assignment of relationships between 
different layers or parameters in the ELECTRE algorithm (for example: indifference 
threshold and preference threshold). The new input information is then used to re-calculate 
the preference ranking. Several iterations may be needed in order to achieve a stable or 
satisfactory ranking result. Then, the preference information for DMs is ready for being 
input into GMCR II.    
    
5.2. Case study: A Transportation Negotiation Problem  
As one of the four drivers of supply chain management, transportation cost is a 
significant portion of the costs that incur in most supply chains (Chopra and Meindl, 2003). 
Recently, modern transportation logistics have been experiencing several important 
transforming trends, such as increasing competition, and growing complexity and 
variability. Challenges raised from these trends require systematic and sophisticated 
optimization solutions involving each organization within supply chains (Putten et al., 
2006).  
Shippers and carriers are two key players in any transportation problem. To build and 
maintain a practical relationship between them has turned out to be critical and prudent. 
Virtually, every facet of such a relationship must be negotiated and stated in a contract 
(Stank and Thomas, 2000). Hence, negotiations between different parties in the 
transportation domain become ineluctable and crucial, especially in the newly-developed 
and widely-employed just-in-time (JIT) systems. Within JIT systems, organizations 
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necessitate very stable and reliable transportation services in order to maintain a low level 
of inventory, and at the same time, guarantee the demand to be completely met. 
In this case study, a hypothetical two-player transportation negotiation problem 
(Bookbinder and Fraser, 1990) is investigated. There are two participants (DMs), a Shipper 
and a Carrier, involved in this negotiation problem. The relationship between shippers and 
carriers is similar to the one between buyers and sellers, but distinguishable due to the 
transportation environment. A Shipper represents the consumer of transportation services, 
while a Carrier is the provider. Manufacturers are a typical example for the shippers. 
Suppose that the two DMs have been maintaining an ongoing cooperative relationship over 
a very long time horizon. However, at a particular situation, some changes might exist. For 
instance, the Carrier might raise the transportation charge in order to obtain higher 
revenues or lower the service level in order to reduce overall costs. The other party in this 
case, the Shipper, would have various responses accordingly. Table 5.1 depicts the 
negotiation model of this situation.  
 
Table 5.1 DMs and Options in the transportation negotiation problem 
DMs Options 
Carrier 1)  Raise price: In order to obtain more revenue. 
 2)  Keep or lower price: In order to keep Shipper as its customer. 
 3)  Lower services: In order to reduce overall costs. 
 4)  Keep or improve services: In order to keep Shipper as its customer. 
Shipper 5)  Accept: Accept Carrier’s price and services 
 6)  Abandon: Abandon this Carrier and choose a private fleet or another carrier.
 7)  Require service: Require a higher level of service than the current one. 
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In this negotiation model, each of the options can be chosen by DMs, denoted by ‘Y’, 
or not chosen, denoted by ‘N’. Thus, mathematically, a total of 7 options would represent 27 
possible combinations. Nevertheless, many of them are impossible in the real situation. For 
example, it is impractical for the Shipper to choose to Accept and Abandon at the same time. 
Similarly, the Carrier cannot simultaneously choose to Raise price and Keep or lower price, 
as well as Lower services and Keep or improve services. The reason is that these options are 
mutually exclusive. Moreover, the Shipper has to react to the Carrier by choosing at least 
one of these two options. After considering all these circumstances, GMCR II automatically 
generates a list of feasible states for this model, which contains the 16 feasible states shown 
by Table 5.2. 
 
Table 5.2 Feasible states 
DMs and Options 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
Carrier    
1) Raise price Y N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y N
2) Keep or lower price N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y
3) Lower services Y Y N N Y Y N N Y Y N N Y Y N N
4) Keep or improve services N N Y Y N N Y Y N N Y Y N N Y Y
Shipper    
5) Accept Y Y Y Y N N N N Y Y Y Y N N N N
6) Abandon N N N N Y Y Y Y N N N N Y Y Y Y
7) Require service N N N N N N N N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
 
 
5.2.1. Construction of the three-layer structure  
From the viewpoint of the Carrier, its major concern is to achieve more profits based 
on the relationship with the current customer, the Shipper. Therefore, two criteria are 
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identified for the Carrier: 1) Increase profits (C1); 2) Maintain a long-term relationship 
with the Shipper (C2). In order to satisfy the first criterion, Increase profits, two actions are 
quite obvious: Increase revenue (A1) and Decrease costs (A2). Also, for the second 
criterion, the Carrier needs to Fulfill Shipper’s requirements (A3) and Improve its 
performance (A4).  
 
 
Figure 5.4 Overall Relationships in the Hierarchical Analytical Model for the Carrier 
 
In the three-layer model, the relationships between the criterion and action layers 
naturally exist because each action corresponds to a specific criterion in the action 
definition procedure. Then, these relationships are extended to the option level. For instance, 
as to the Carrier, two options, the Carrier Raise price (O1) and the Shipper Accept (O5), 
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result in the action of Increase revenue (A1). Thus, the connections from A1 to O1 and A1 
to O5 are established. The overall relationships for the Carrier are shown in Figure 5.4. 
After the construction of these relationships, a normalized weight is assigned to each 
relationship to represent the importance or the interests of the DM under study. For 
example, from the viewpoint of the Carrier, both actions Increase revenue (A1) and 
Decrease costs (A2) are equally attributable to the criterion Increase profits (C1). So a 
weight of 0.5 is assigned to either relationship. All the assigned weights for criterion-action 
and action-option layers are shown in Tables 5.3 and 5.4, respectively.  
 
Table 5.3 Weights for the Criterion-Action Layer 
Criteria Actions Weights
A1: Increase revenue 0.5 
C1: Increase profits 
A2: Decrease costs 0.5 
A3: Fulfill Shipper’s requirements  0.5 C2: Maintain a long-term relationship with 
Shipper A4: Improve its performance 0.5 
 
Table 5.4 Weights for the Action-Option Layer 
Actions Options  Weights 
O1: Raise price 0.6 
A1: Increase revenue 
O5: Accept 0.4 
O3: Lower services 0.6 
A2: Decrease costs 
O5: Accept 0.4 
O4: Keep or raise services 0.4 
O5: Accept 0.4 A3: Fulfill Shipper’s requirements  
O7: Require services 0.2 
O2: Keep or lower price 0.5 
A4: Improve its performance 
O4: Keep or raise services 0.5 
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5.2.2. Synthesis of the evaluation matrix    
 Figure 5.5 depicts the procedure for constructing the evaluation matrix for the first 
criterion, Increase profits, and its hierarchical relationships with states via the action and 
option levels, as well as the relevant weights. For a criterion, each entry in the evaluation 
matrix can be determined by a linear aggregation method, as explained previously. 
Consider state 2 for the Carrier, for example, the entry for this state under the criterion, 
Increase profits, is calculated as follows: 









Figure 5.5 Assigned weights associated with Criterion 1 for the Carrier. 
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5.2.3. Calculation of the relative ranking of states   
 Based on this evaluation matrix, the calculation of the relative ranking of states is ready 
to be carried out using the fuzzy MCDM approach as detailed in Section 5.1.5. In this case 
study, indifference, preference and veto thresholds are set to be 0.03, 0.25 and 0.5, 
respectively.  
As explained in Section 5.1, the fuzzy preference relation, iaPb , is firstly calculated 
by the pairwise comparison of two states’ evaluation values. Then, the weighted sum of the 
preference degree, the concordance relation, aCb , is accordingly obtained. Additionally, 
the discordance index, iad b , and corresponding aggregation are also computed by 
comparing the evaluations of two states and employing a fuzzy operation. Through the 
computation of aCb  and iad b , the outranking relation, aRb , is attained, and, thus, the 
overall preference evaluation value, Φ , is finalized. Table 5.5 provides the final preference 
values of states for the Carrier, as well as the preference values for the Shipper, where the 
larger a preference value is, the more preferred the corresponding state is. Therefore, the 
preference rankings for two DMs are elicited and listed in Table 5.6. The states within a 
square bracket are equally preferred by the given DM.  
The relative preferences may be fine-tuned to reconcile the ranking results with the 
situation in the real world. Sensitivity analyses may be carried out by changing weights and 
assignments of relationships between different layers or parameters for ELECTRE, such as, 




Table 5.5 Relative Preference Information 
States Carrier Shipper 
1 0.76 -3.34 
2 3.09 2.00 
3 7.13 2.00 
4 2.94 9.02 
5 -5.04 -5.84 
6 -7.50 -3.68 
7 -4.28 -3.68 
8 -3.88 -1.84 
9 2.13 -0.16 
10 4.61 6.86 
11 8.11 6.86 
12 3.56 10.84 
13 -4.40 -5.18 
14 -5.96 -2.00 
15 -2.46 -2.00 
16 -2.84 -0.50 
 
Table 5.6 Preference rankings  
DMs 
Preference Rankings 
Most preferred < ----------------------------------------------------------------> Least preferred
Carrier 11 3 10 12 2 4 9 1 15 16 8 7 13 5 14 6 
Shipper 12 4 [10 11] [2 3] 9 16 8 [14 15] 1 [6 7] 13 5 
 
  
5.2.4. Stability analysis   
 After the hierarchical analysis approach is utilized to obtain preference rankings for 
each DM in the conflict model, the ranking results serve as input into GMCR II. Then, the 
stability of every state for each DM can be calculated by running GMCR II.  
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When a state is stable according to a specific solution concept for all DMs in a conflict, 
the state constitutes an equilibrium under the solution concept. This implies that no DM has 
the incentive to move away from that state unilaterally. Table 5.7 lists the unique strongest 
equilibrium, state 11, which is stable for all solution concepts. This resolution indicates that: 
1) the Carrier will raise price and keep or improve the service level; and 2) the Shipper will 
require higher service level and accept the price and services offered by the Carrier. 
 
Table 5.7 Equilibrium for the transportation negotiation problem 
 DMs and Options 11 
Carrier  
1) Raise price Y 
2) Keep or lower price N 
3) Lower services N 
4) Keep or improve services Y 
Shipper  
5) Accept Y 
6) Abandon N 
7) Require service Y 
 
 
5.2.5. Status quo analysis   
As stated in the modeling procedure, at the status quo, described by state 4, the Carrier 
and the Shipper are maintaining an ongoing cooperative relationship, which indicates that 
these two parties agree with a certain level of price and services. At a particular time point, 
the Carrier tries to increase their profits by raising the service price. So the situation moves 
from state 4 to state 3. Subsequently, the Shipper still wants to keep a long-term 
relationship with the Carrier and, therefore, decides to discuss a higher rate for a premium 
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service. Thus, the equilibrium is achieved. This state transition from the status quo to state 
11 is depicted in Table 5.8. 
 
Table 5.8 State transition from the status quo to state 11 
 Status Quo  Transitional State  Equilibrium
 DMs and Options 4  3  11 
Carrier      
1) Raise price N Y  Y 
2) Keep or lower price Y N  N 
3) Lower services N  N  N 
4) Keep or improve services Y  Y  Y 
Shipper      
5) Accept Y  Y  Y 
6) Abandon N  N  N 
7) Require service N  N  Y 
 
 
5.3. Summary    
Relative preferences constitute the most important information required for modeling a 
strategic conflict using the Graph Model for Conflict Resolution. A hierarchical preference 
analysis procedure is presented in this chapter to enrich preference elicitation approaches 
implemented in GMCR II. An extra action layer is introduced into the hierarchical analysis 
methodology and serves as a bridge for a user to disclose the relationships between criteria 
and alternatives or states. Thus, the three-layer structure provides a solid platform for 
aggregating option weighting with fuzzy MCDM and ELECTRE-based methodologies and 
forming a criterion-oriented preference ranking technique, which can readily handle both 









Two multiple criteria decision making approaches are developed for eliciting relative 
preferences for decision makers included in a graph model. The first preference ranking 
approach, presented in Chapter 4, is a modified Analytical Hierarchy Procedure that 
considers not only each decision maker’s individual preferences, but also his or her power 
of influence over the entire situation. The other effort given in Chapter 5 refines a 
three-layer hierarchical multiple criteria decision analysis (Fu, 2003), which utilizes a fuzzy 
multiple criteria technique called ELECTRE III and aims to obtain required preferences 
based on the values or criteria of a given decision maker. 
In order to demonstrate the integration of these methods with the graph model for 
conflict resolution, two case studies are carried out. In the first case study, the Canadian 
west coast port congestion problem is examined within the graph model framework. The 
strategic analyses carried out in this research suggest potential resolutions in which Canada 
would expand port facilities at various locations, encouraging traders to continue choosing 
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the Canadian west coast as one of their trade gateways to North America. Another case 
study involving transportation negotiations between the shipper and the carrier is conducted 
for illustrating the three-layer hierarchical multiple criteria decision analysis for preference 
elicitation. 
 
6.1. Comparison of the Two Proposed Approaches 
In addition to utilizing MCDM techniques to generate preference rankings, both 
approaches proposed in this thesis involve a hierarchical structure with weights, based on 
which the preference elicitation procedure is carried out. However, several differences also 
exist. For example, the two hierarchies have distinct contents, MCDM techniques are used 
in dissimilar ways, and ELECTRE III is essentially a fuzzy approach while the other one is 
not. Table 6.1 lists the commonalities and differences between the two approaches. 
Essentially, each approach deals with the negative preference issue in its own manner. 
Opposite to positive preference information, a negative preference indicates that the DM 
prefers not to choose a particular option. In a regular case, the option with a negative 
preference can be assigned a negative weight. As stated in Chapter 4, the adapted AHP 
approach calculates the weight for each option by pairwise comparison. Thus, the negative 
preference problem is avoided by assigning a comparatively lower weight to the option that 
has a negative preference.  
Alternatively, in the other approach, modifications of options within the modeling stage 
are very helpful. More specifically, for each option with a negative preference, an 
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additional opposite option is added to the given analytical model. Subsequently, because the 
additional options are opposite, they have positive preferences and are considered in a 
similar fashion to the original options.  
 
Table 6.1 The commonalities and differences between the two proposed approaches 
 
 Adapted AHP approach Three-layer hierarchical approach 
1) Both are approaches based on MCDM techniques, and 
integrated with the methodology of GMCR in order to capture 
the relative preference information. 
Commonalities 
2) Both methods employ a hierarchical structure to carry out 
the calculations. Different layers within the structure are 
connected by relationships and weights. 
1) Contents of Hierarchy DMs’ influence powers and individual preferences. 
DMs’ criteria and 
corresponding actions. 
2) MCDM is used for? 
AHP is used to construct the 
hierarchical structure and 
obtain weights. 
ELECTRE III is used to 
calculate the preference 
values of the states. 
3) Fuzzy? No. Yes. 
Differences 
4) Negative preferences? Avoid the problem through pairwise comparison. 
Solve the problem through 
modifications of options. 
 
 
6.2. Summary of Contributions  
(1) Two multiple criteria decision making methods are presented to elicit a preference 
ranking of states for each decision maker involved in a conflict within the paradigm of the 
graph model for conflict resolution. In addition to the regular techniques used to generate 
preference information in GMCR II, these two methods enhance this function by 
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considering each decision maker’s power of influence over the entire situation and his/her 
criteria or objectives, respectively. The derived information is then reentered into the 
GMCR II system for further stability analyses. 
(2) As an ongoing real-world conflict, the case study of the Canadian west coast 
congestion dispute furnishes a unique visual angle to fast-growing international trade, 
especially for the Canadian government. Moreover, this case may reflect many similar 
situations throughout the world. Interested parties may gain useful information and better 
understanding of different situations, which could facilitate their decision-making 
processes. 
(3) Transportation is one of the most important dimensions in the modern logistics 
environment. The relationships between shippers and carriers, two key parties involved in 
transportation, are always critical and sophisticated. The graph model analysis enables 
various parties, not only shippers and carriers themselves, but also other interested parties, 
such as supply chain organizers or researchers, a diverse aspect to systematically study and 
provides strategic advice for transportation negotiations.   
 
6.3. Future Research Opportunities   
The two approaches introduced in this thesis are based on two MCDM techniques, 
AHP and ELECTRE III. In fact, many other MCDM or outranking techniques, such as 
ANP (Saaty, 1996, 2001, 2005), MELCHIOR (Leclercq, 1984), TRICHOTOMIC 
(Moscarola and Roy, 1977; Roy, 1981), PROMETHEE (Brans and Vincke, 1985), are also 
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available and may be applied to the procedure of eliciting preference information.  
Next, because of their sensitivity, preferences may be affected by many different 
matters. Emotional issues are a specific example. Also, as the situation moves from one 
stage to another, the preferences may change accordingly. In addition, interactions between 
different parties might affect the preferences. Therefore, one possible line of research is to 
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